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The sophisticated psychological and technological targeting methods which had been developed by 
the commercial advertising industry has been leveraged by the political parties in recent elections 
(Papakyriakopoulos, Hegelich, Shahrezaye, & Serrano, 2018; Bodó, Helberger, & de Vreese, 2017; 
Chester & Montgomery, 2017, EDPS 2018: 11).  
But the impact of commercial advertising is different from that of political advertising: first, political 
competition culminates in one common decision passed by the political community, which affects 
each member of that polity, whereas commercial decisions are individually made, and effect mainly 
the same individual. Second, commercial decisions are more or less based on rational consideration, 
but political preferences are to a large extent emotional (Weir, 2019). It has been observed that voters’ 
preference for their political candidate is not influenced by debunking what their favourite has said 
(Swire at al. 2017). This is a signal of the audience’s vulnerability in the context of political manipu-
lation: people of all political beliefs are more prone to bias, and less likely to recognise bias consistent 
with their political belief (Ditto et al., 2018). 
The democratic deliberative process should ideally be based on an open public discourse (Habermas, 
1996), a free exchange of thoughts on the marketplace of ideas (Mill, 1863). According to some 
theories, the citizenry ought to develop a general will (volonté du peuple, Rousseau, 1789, Dunning, 
1909). In any case, possessing a common information basis appears necessary for a society to func-
tion, to pass and accept political decisions. “In a well-functioning democracy, people do not live in 
[an] echo chamber or information cocoons” (Sunstein, 2007).  
Political micro-targeting shares selected messages only with a carefully tailored audience. The basis 
of selection are the personal data of the users, traces that they leave while browsing, posting, sharing 
and liking.  
 
2 VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION 
This paper argues that beyond violating privacy rights of the targeted users, micro-targeted political 
advertising robs non-targeted voters of the information which is communicated to the targeted 
voters. This violates their right to information, which is the counterpart of freedom of expression, 
as expressed by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Theorists like Dworkin, 
Mill, Baker, Barendt, Meiklejohn have emphasized that democratic formation of the public's political 
will should be based on common discussion of public matters. Expressions, especially political ex-
pressions are protected, but speech which reduces diversity and access to information, can be legiti-
mately restricted on the basis of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. 
Data-driven political campaigns lead to a collision of freedom of political expression and the right to 
information. Paradoxically, the balancing should be made not between two fundamental rights, but 
the two sides of the same fundamental right. Political expressions are the most highly protected forms 
of expression, while access to information, and the public informational landscape as such, is also a 
cornerstone of the democratic system.  
An important aspect of the discussion is, whether micro-targeting can be used for “beneficial” pur-
poses. Indeed, not all uses are manipulative, malicious uses. First, even beneficial purposed applica-
tions of this method fragment the public information landscape. However, there may be situations 
when this fragmentation is desired for the social good. For political purposes, micro-targeted political 
advertising could provide detailed information in special areas, to interested voters. For purposes of 
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education, it could apply micro-targeted “social purpose advertisements” as ‘nudges’. For example, 
addressing persons with certain characteristics to inform them about healthy habits, information lit-
eracy, etc. If micro-targeted political – and commercial – advertising is liberally allowed (as it cur-
rently is), then nudges are also applicable. Where is the limit of intrusion to personal matters, and 
what should be the safeguards?  
3 PLATFORM POLICIES 
Since 2019, giant social media platforms developed their policy regarding political ads. Twitter opted 
for completely rejecting political ads, while Facebook set transparency rules and created an ad repos-
itory. However, this repository proved insufficient to provide information about targeting criteria, and 
whether vulnerabilities have been exploited (Panoptykon, 2020, Edelson, Lauinger & McCoy, 2020), 
and did not cooperate with researchers adequately to ensure transparency (Forbes, 2020). ERGA’s 
monitoring found that the databases required further development in order to provide the tools and 
data necessary to ensure the required level of transparency (ERGA, 2019). 
The draft European regulatory action 'Digital Services Act' provides that the repository should also 
contain the main parameters of microtargeting and other relevant data (Article 30, DSA), as well as 
access to such data (Article 31) – but with significant exceptions (Section 6. Article 31).  
The paper's novelty lies in translating the violation of individual rights into collective rights – the 
right to information and a fair political campaign. Based on a legal analysis of fundamental rights, 
and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it makes a statement at the intersection of 
political theory and communication theory.  
The topic is likely to raise discussion for some reasons. First, because the freedom of political expres-
sion is a very strong fundamental political right, and its restriction – even if it would affect only 
certain types of transmission – is a delicate issue. Moreover, the class which is the most affected, 
major political parties, are counter-interested, as they would benefit from this practice, which can be 
best leveraged by financially strong actors. Second, there is a current dispute around the concept of 
fragmentation of the public sphere, and the interpretation of its consequences. 
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